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Abstract   
 
The aim of this article is to discuss the notion of vulnerability and suffering as an aspect of 
animal bodily existence that, despite its negative connotations, is a highly interesting point 
of convergence for human-animal studies and the branch of aesthetics concerned with 
the interplay of individual and collective affectivities in the works of art. Arguing for 
the existence of a cross-species community of affect, the author bases her analyses on 
Judith Butler’s ontology of precariousness and seeks to establish a vital connection be-
tween the political and social experience of vulnerability on the one hand, and rituals of 
mourning inspired by compassion on the other. The argument points to the possibility 
of charting new trajectories of affect in political praxis and art which do not only establish 
a cross-species community of suffering, but also bridge the gap between humans and 
animals as religious subjects, which is conceived here as a profoundly emancipatory ges-
ture. 
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Introduction:  
The Aesthetics of Affect and Animal Vulnerability 
 
We are all seen by animals. Individual animals with their own 
biographies and sufferings and desires […]. This is a basic datum, 
a naked fact, a fact shared among the sentient: we look at each 
other. We are naked, vulnerable, exposed, suffering, and we can 
communicate this to each other. […] 
We are born into our own vulnerability among vulnerable others, 
and a basic restraint—the seed of what we are here calling com-
passion—must be present for the world to continue […] The reali-
zation that “yes, [animals] suffer” cannot be doubted because it is 
prior to the subject who asks questions—it is in a sense the origin 
of questioning. 
Aaron S. Gross, The Question of the Animal and Religion 
 
Being in pain, suffering, feeling vulnerable and susceptible to violence are all 
modes of experience available to both human and non-human agents as they 
are endowed with flesh and share the faculty of sentience. The community of 
suffering, vulnerability and finitude is merely “a basic datum, a naked fact” 
(Gross 2014, 127) that precedes all reasoning and philosophical speculation: 
something so plain and obvious to see that it becomes conspicuous and 
shaming. Even so, it is also conspicuously absent from the aesthetics and 
ethics of quotidian human existence, which has its own notion of bodily 
susceptibility and physical distress that in most cases serves simply to un-
derscore human exceptionalism. Narratives of pain and illness transform 
the human body into a site of communicable experience that attracts atten-
tion and triggers sympathy. Thus, even the most monstrous display of physi-
cal degeneration can be rendered back to the image of the individual, highly 
precious intelligent life-form that it used to be prior to its period of mal-
functioning, and which it still is, despite signs to the contrary. In asking for 
the response of compassion, human beings more often than not insist on 
being treated as individual beings, temporarily locked in physical distress 
and betrayed by their bodies, yet still proudly asserting their belonging to 
the “healthy” part of the human species. In this way, bodily suffering be-
comes disavowed rather than lived: a private problem to be overcome by 
technical (or medical) means, a purely negative episode which is most often 
to be erased from an individual biography once it is gone. 
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Discourses of human ill-being are therefore commonly buttressed by in-
dividualist ontologies, ones that focus their efforts on reintegrating illness 
and suffering into the structure of moral subjectivity. This essay wishes to 
argue, however, that there is much more to vulnerability than the celebra-
tion of individual injuriousness. Vulnerability and suffering are affective 
positions that can be widely shared, intensely social facts and political op-
portunities that help us make connections with other beings, and are even 
capable of crossing the boundaries of species. As such, they have an emanci-
patory potential that should not be overlooked; one which is indeed not 
overlooked in acts and works of compassionate imagination. Literature and 
art provide ample space and means to promote and share these politically 
potent affects. 
In the article that follows I will address the notion of vulnerability as an 
aspect of bodily existence that most often remains socially ostracised, yet is 
still a highly interesting point of convergence for human-animal studies 
and the branch of aesthetics interested in the way individual and collective 
affectivities surface in works of art and literature. Importantly, the claim 
the essay makes is that animal susceptibility to injury, violence and death is 
closely linked to the erasure of the presence of non-human beings in com-
munal living, which serves to justify their exploitation on a massive scale. 
Their fate is sealed by radical ungrievability, a stance of not being (even po-
tentially) mourned. Animal suffering and deprivation is thus aggravated as 
it is not accompanied by publically recognised acts of mourning. Even more 
private than human illness and passing away, the recognition of animals’ 
capacity for pain and for being subjects of life that can be lost sadly remains 
a subjective decision for human beings. The fact of their being “naked, vul-
nerable, exposed, suffering” (Gross 2014, 127) and precarious, or at every 
point threatened with decay and non-existence, is rarely recognised as 
the shared condition of embodiment. To paraphrase the description from 
the quotation above, the most frequent response of the human being looking 
at an animal is to avert their gaze from, rather than to exchange it with, 
the afflicted creature. 
The discussion of animals in terms of “unmournable lives” obviously 
owes much to Judith Butler’s social ontology of precariousness, which views 
all living things as radically interdependent and acknowledges that their 
chance of surviving relies on the cultural and historical image of what con-
stitutes a life worthy of protection and sustenance. According to Butler, to-
gether with the production of the social knowledge of what life and death is, 
whole categories or groups of beings emerge who are under-recognised 
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as constructions of life. Their bodies, vulnerable by definition, stand at 
the boundaries of the socially accepted notions of humanity and subject-
hood, a fact that renders the loss of their lives insignificant, or not worthy of 
sympathy, contemplation and symbolic prolongation in political or religious 
gestures of remembrance. Hence, to cross the threshold of mourning, to 
become politically visible as subjects of grief and compassion, as it became 
all too evident in the media images of dead refugees on European shores, 
may ironically be the only way of symbolic appreciation available to these 
marginalised human lives. Mourning depends on the interpretative frame-
works that delimit what we apprehend as living and grievable, but it is 
an affective structure that may also call the frameworks into question. 
Thus, extending the range of beings identified as the bodies of suffering, and 
enabling “a new trajectory of affect” (Butler 2009, 11) which is endowed 
with political and moral significance seems to be intertwined with establish-
ing new practices and rituals of grieving. 
Mourning can thus be seen as emancipatory whenever it becomes a radi-
cal gesture of identification with and recognition of a singular being whose 
life has lost its legitimacy. It is a celebration of the unprecedented relation-
ship to the bearer of that life which is capable of transgressing the social 
norm of who is to be grieved and what it means to grieve. Yet the question 
remains whether the relationship can be even more transgressive than in 
the case mentioned above, that of the underprivileged and dehumanised 
victims of war and oppression. Can the acknowledgment and commemora-
tion of the loss of a living creature, a symbolic and religious act, and one that 
demonstrates the mourner’s political resistance to previously committed 
acts of violence, refer to other-than-human existence? This article will 
respond in the affirmative, suggesting that some complex ideas, including 
vulnerability, mourning and compassion, read against the background of 
politics, ethics and theology, can sensibly be applied to the task of depicting 
the relationship of human animals to other sentient beings. Moreover, 
the role of religion is far from negligible in this respect, even if the conven-
tional aim of religious discourse has been to liberate the human self from its 
supposedly embarrassing animal origins. 
Viewed from the perspective of philosophy and religion, mourning and 
compassion can thus be conceived as radical gestures, which are potentially 
emancipatory to non-human agents. My intention is not only to point to 
the constitution of the interspecies community of vulnerability and suffering 
as something that undermines anthropocentric privilege, but also to present 
religious experience, which includes celebration of some of the most signifi-
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cant moments of physical existence, as a realm of social affect and bodily 
response that is common to different species. The case some political cam-
paigns and works of art make for the actual engagement of animals in hu-
man rites of passage—the way animals become a mournable presence, 
awarded political and aesthetic/symbolic recognition—reflects a more 
general tendency among humanities scholars to reconsider the notion of 
human exceptionality based on the religious and metaphysical view of what 
constitutes personhood, and to bridge the gap between humans and animals 
as both philosophical and religious subjects. 
 
Precariousness and Suffering/Mournable Lives 
 
The notion of precariousness has been a constant presence in Judith Butler’s 
work for more than a decade now (Butler 2000, 2004, 2009, 2012 and 
2015), marking her interest in what can be identified as the basis of social 
solidarity among various vulnerable subjects, including those that do not 
automatically belong to a community bound by immediate moral obliga-
tions. What makes us respond ethically to suffering and to be overwhelmed 
with affects such as horror and outrage at its sight if there is no obvious 
connection—no close relationship of blood and ideology—binding us to 
the body in pain? And why is the situation that in the first place renders 
the body unrecognisable as a socially respectable form of life also productive 
of an emotion that may inspire acts of ethical and political significance 
in defence of that life? To answer these questions, as Butler has striven to do, 
it is essential to think of a vulnerable body as not just an individual organism 
affected by unfavourable conditions in its immediate environment but as 
crucially located in the network of relations that it has to rely on for its 
preservation and well-being. Bodily life is universally precarious, or exposed 
to both pleasure and suffering precisely because of its being social, and being 
social means “being bound to one another and to living processes that ex-
ceed human form” (Butler 2012, 141). A individual life form is distinct and 
yet its boundary provides not only the limit of its being but also a site of ad-
jacency which is often, in political terms, a zone of “unwilled proximity and 
unchosen cohabitation” (145), resulting in diverse forms of interaction that 
can both sustain and destroy an individual. Precariousness or vulnerability 
is thus the foundation of the ontology of the body which points to interde-
pendency as both an ethical/existential fact and a point of departure for 
social and political considerations. 
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The relationship between sociality, vulnerability and death or mourning 
is also of vital significance to the post-deconstruction interventions of Jean-    
-Luc Nancy, especially when he elaborates on the notions of exposure and 
finitude, drawing on the Heideggerian discussion of Mitsein (being-with) in 
Sein und Zeit. The topic is discussed at length in Nancy’s The Inoperative 
Community (1988). Having asserted the closure of the modern philosophical 
project as it fantasises about the individual self-constitution in a social 
void—since “death irremediably exceeds the resources of a metaphysics of 
the subject” (Nancy 1991, 14)—the French thinker turns to the examination 
of singularity that is always already grounded in relation to other singu-
larities by referring to beings other than itself. This relation or openness 
is originary, in that Dasein  (the notion of an individual self which points to 
a peculiarly human way of existing) is a being for whom engagement with 
being “there” or being exposed to whatever there is outside of the self is part 
of its ontological definition. Nancy thus dwells on the impossibility of imma-
nence conceived as isolation or communion understood as fusion (29), 
pointing out that being-in-common (being in community) is about offering 
and sharing between singularities, and what must be exposed and shared is 
the experience of mortality/finitude. In fact, that which defines community, 
communication, is best described as the event of the co-appearance 
of finitude because a “finite being always presents itself together”, in 
“the between as such: you and I” (28–29; emphasis in the original). In the 
subsequent passages of Nancy’s work, the presentation of finitude is re-
vealed as that of “the triple mourning I must go through: that of the death of 
the other, that of my birth, and that of my death” (30). The importance of 
the death of the other is not to be overlooked here: Nancy follows Bataille 
and Blanchot in suggesting that going beyond oneself or discovering the 
possibility of community is primarily found through exposure to the painful 
epiphany of someone else’s utmost vulnerability (Blanchot 1988, 9 and 25). 
And, quite significantly, Nancy also signals at one point that this sharing of 
finitude may pertain to beings other than human, though the possibility is 
never analysed in much detail (1991, 28). 
Butler’s work is similarly anchored in existential-ontological considera-
tions; these are however properly counterbalanced by social contextualisa-
tion. In her view, being fragile and susceptible to injury can be very specific 
through its connection to unequal political and economic conditions, which 
is referred to as precarity. It is thus imperative to recognise the distribution 
of precarity as a basic fact of social living and to strive for its more egalitar-
ian character, starting from the premise of universal bodily precariousness. 
Vulnerability, exposure to injury, violence and death, erasure of social pres-
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ence or stigmatisation all belong to the same narrative referring to the lot of 
individuals and groups of individuals who live their precarious lives literally 
on the fraying edges of the communal fabric. The examination of their spec-
tral existence, an aim of the discourse of social solidarity the Ameri-
can thinker has consistently been developing in recent years, starts from 
the premise that it is haunted by an acute sense of loss. The loss stems from 
the fact that their disgrace and deprivation is hardly ever accompanied by 
any public acts of recognition. In Butler’s words, an unrecognised existence 
is not a grievable life, i.e., life in the fully human sense, one deserving sym-
pathy, reflection, political gestures of emotional identification and, finally, 
mourning and grief, as a celebration of the ultimate departure from 
the community of the living. “Only under conditions in which the loss would 
matter does the value of the life appear. Thus, grievability is a presupposi-
tion for the life that matters” (Butler 2009, 14). And there is certainly a lot 
to be said about this uncomfortable proximity between vulnerability and 
erasure of mourning, especially as the juxtaposition seems to be vibrating 
with ethical, political and religious overtones. The practice of mourning and 
remembrance is the staple of human culture: that humans have evolved 
the need for respecting and paying homage to their deceased is most often 
treated as the ultimate proof of the intellectual integrity and self-reflexivity 
of the species. Hence its absence always remains conspicuous. 
This spectacle of vulnerability and impossible grieving brings to mind 
Sophocles’ old story, painstakingly analysed in one of Butler’s books . 
Antigone, who insists on the absolute singularity or irreplaceability 
of the event of her brother’s death regardless of the political circumstances, 
enforces her right to mourn the exposed body, naked and vulnerable, al-
ready rotting, the body of the dearest family member, in the name of com-
passion and religious devotion, and in defiance of the law. The burial rites 
are here performed twice, even though they are obviously and “fatally crim-
inal” (Butler 2000, 79). Antigone’s insistence on the official act of mourning 
can thus be read as a radical gesture of identification with and recognition of 
a singular being whose life has long lost its legitimacy, as well as a celebra-
tion of her unprecedented relationship to the bearer of that life which trans-
gresses the social norm of what it means to grieve. The nature of the trans-
gression is contemplated in Butler’s work by pointing to the incestuous 
legacy behind Antigone’s actions. Yet, one may ask, can the relationship be 
even more transgressive? Can the acknowledgment and commemoration of 
the loss of a living creature, a political and religious act, and one that demon-
strates the mourner’s resistance to violence, vulnerability and suffering, 
extend beyond the human realm? 
120 A l i n a  M i t e k - D z i e m b a  
__________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
The starting point for this discussion is the claim that Butler’s notion of 
precariousness, viewed as the basic somatic condition of individual and col-
lective living, is what apparently spills over boundaries between species, 
at times rendering them irrelevant. Judith Butler’s argument has indeed 
been interpreted in non-anthropocentric terms.1 Sentient lives are univer-
sally precarious simply because their bodily being can be affected in a vari-
ety of ways: regardless of the species, they are vulnerable to suffering and 
destruction caused by others since they “depend upon one another for shel-
ter and sustenance” and are thus at risk from different forms of abuse “under 
unjust and unequal political conditions” (Butler 2012, 148). The interde-
pendence of living creatures is ontological and existential (it belongs to 
the dimension of “shared finitude”), while the degree of their precarity fol-
lows from a given historical configuration of social and economic forces that 
pertain both to human culture and the natural environment. For Butler, poli-
tics is about managing populations (and these populations, we hasten to add, 
are both human and non-human, as they are impossible to disentangle). 
This takes place through the tactical and unequal distribution of precarity, 
on the basis of “dominant norms regarding whose life is grievable and worth 
protecting, and whose life is ungrievable or marginally or episodically griev-
able […], and thus less worthy of protection and sustenance” (Butler 2012, 
148). An individual body may thus persist and flourish or, contrariwise, may 
be subject to violence and destruction, depending on whether it is recog-
nised as a life and a subject to the same extent as are others. It seems, how-
ever, that the normative conditions of recognisability operate first and fore-
most on the collective level: as already pointed out, in the social world there 
emerge whole categories or groups of beings who are under-recognised as 
constructions of life. These bodies, vulnerable by definition, with a highly 
insecure ontological constitution, stand at the boundaries of the socially 
accepted notions of livability, grievability and subjecthood, and are threat-
ened to be blurred or erased.2 
                                                 
1 For an example of a non-anthropocentric argument in Butler’s work, see this passage 
from her discussion of the ethical philosophies of Arendt and Levinas: “In my view, some 
ethical claims emerge from bodily life and perhaps all ethical claims presuppose a bodily 
life, understood as injurable, one that is not restrictively human. After all, the life that is 
worth preserving and safeguarding, who should be protected from murder (Levinas) and 
genocide (Arendt), is connected to, and dependent upon, nonhuman life in essential ways; 
this follows from the idea of the human animal, as Derrida has articulated it, which be-
comes a different point of departure for thinking about politics” (Butler 2012, 147). See 
also Stanescu 2012, 567–582. 
2 Butler’s narrative underscores the liminal and spectral quality of these lives, as 
a ghostly presence that keeps haunting social ontology. Her argument seems to owe much 
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Realising that precariousness is a universal condition describing 
the common lot of various sentient creatures is however not sufficient for 
any political action to take place, just as the incessant flow of media images 
of lost lives is hardly ever enough to make one stage one’s opposition to 
suffering and violence. Precisely, we may ask, how and why do we become 
moved by a loss of life to the point that we start to grieve for it, questioning 
its exclusion from the community of mournable lives? Butler makes it clear 
that precariousness translates into a sense of existential obligation towards 
others, also those “we cannot name and do not know” or those who “may not 
bear traits of familiarity to an established sense of who ‘we’ are”(Butler 
2009, 14). This cosmopolitan obligation may however be difficult to expli-
cate on other than philosophical or religious grounds. As some of Butler’s 
critics note, she “appears to rest her hopes for practicing ethics in precar-
itized situations on the abstract potentiality for ethical openness”, which 
may not be enough to spur individuals and societies to action (Lloyd 2015, 
230). What is needed is both the ability to recognise precarious lives 
as worth protecting and, in the final instance, grieving for, and a socially 
heterodox affect responding to their miserable condition, a sort of trans-
gressive compassion arising from the realisation of similitude. The lesson of 
sympathetic imagination comes with the imminence of grief within a felt 
community of the living, and the community becomes all the more tangible 
in extreme circumstances such as war or natural disasters. Facing loss 
and participating in mourning, reacting with sadness, horror and guilt to 
the suffering and demise of others, though a disheartening experience, can 
also be valuable in that it enables the perception of all living beings as vul-
nerable, dependent on others and the environment, radically contingent and 
“exposed to non-life from the start” (Butler 2009, 15). Whether these forms 
of affect lead to political action is a different matter but they evidently make 
possible new forms of connectedness, which may also cross the species bar-
rier. 
In her recent essays, Judith Butler provides numerous examples of cir-
cumstances and conditions that contribute to the making of vulnerable and 
ungrievable bodies: these are situations connected with war, imprisonment, 
forced migration, unemployment, a failing system of social support, or the 
use of arbitrary violence by the state. She does not extend her argument any 
                                                                                                               
to the Derridean dialectic of the inside and outside: “What is this spectre that gnaws at 
the norms of recognition, an intensified figure vacillating as its inside and its outside? 
As inside, it must be expelled to purify the norm; as outside, it threatens  to undo 
the boundaries that limn the self” (Butler 2009, 12). See also Derrida 1987, 18 ff.  
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further, but the systematic sanctioning of violence against some human lives, 
their disposability and anonymity, their progressive extermination, may 
bring to mind the immense scale of the exploitation and annihilation of ani-
mals in human industry, taking place in ways that would be judged mon-
strous by people in previous ages. The notion of precariousness seems to be 
exceptionally well-suited to the discussion of the lot of animal bodies—
nameless, ignored, produced as redundant objects and killed without a sec-
ond thought. If there is a clear instance of an ungrievable life, disavowed 
as a living and suffering creature and made disposable beyond hope, it is 
the existence of animals, especially the ones bred for consumption. It is cru-
elly ironic that in relation to other sentient beings, some of them qualifying 
as close human relatives, the narrative of shared embodiment, vulnerability 
and finitude seems to the majority of people far-fetched. From the perspec-
tive of the social ontology based on the idea of physical persistence, how-
ever, humans and animals are all alike: permeable bodies, bound to others 
and at threat from external intervention. Butler herself invites the inter-
species application of her theory by stating that it is not possible to draw 
a firm distinction between the bios of the animal and the bios of the human 
in a way that would demonstrate the distinctive features of the latter (Butler 
2009, 19). In many passages she is also explicit about the anti-anthro-
pocentric thrust of her argument. Still, to draw the final consequences from 
the analogy is to admit that there are a large number of precarious lives be-
yond the human realm that are still unmourned and that deserve to be 
mourned in order to recognise and reduce their precarity. 
Admittedly, the thought of caring for anonymous animals sacrificing their 
lives for the sake of satisfying human needs, of finding animal beings griev-
able, may appear radical and unthought-of to the point of risking sense. 
There is, however, an enormous potential in the gesture which imparts visi-
bility to the animal condition by linking it to so many spheres of human life, 
whether public or private, political or religious. As James Stanescu remarks, 
mourning is a way of making connections, of establishing or recognising 
kinship; who gets to mourn and who is mournable shows which bodies 
matter socially and politically (Stanescu 2012, 568). To be in mourning, 
to demonstrate one’s grief, is not only to overcome the feeling of shame con-
nected with the public display of emotion, but also to point to a mourned 
existence as worthy of being celebrated, as a subject of remembrance and, 
possibly, of philosophical or religious reference. Mourning is essentially pri-
vate, yet it may also create a sense of community, not only with those who 
are lost and grieved for but also among those who are stricken by grief. 
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It may thus become a promise of the common effort to minimise suffering 
and the loss of lives. With regard to animals, the recognition of their em-
bodiment and fragility as something essentially shared with humans not 
only inspires com-passion (Latin compassio is “the ability to suffer with”) but 
also emancipates them as agents, as social subjects, those who can partici-
pate in rites of passage and are even themselves capable of mourning their 
relatives. The last argument has often been cited in support of the notion of 
animal religion, and it is the religious quality of animal living that will be 
discussed next, apparently the most interesting result of the application of 
Butler’s ontology beyond the narrow confines of anthropocentrism. 
Grieving for animals is an exercise in human sympathetic imagination 
which may or may not be grounded in religious sentiment. Animal grief, 
a response to the death of close companions that cannot be reduced to 
merely instinctual behaviour, is a different matter, making one ponder 
whether the human definition of religion is expansive enough to account for 
this individual and social experience apparently involving elements of ritual. 
Cognitive ethology researching “the emotional lives of animals”, to remem-
ber Mark Bekoff’s famous title (Bekoff 2007, 62–69), has long provided 
evidence of the quasi-religious behaviour of some species when they are 
confronted by the passing away of their fellows, including what seems to be 
both affective and symbolic reactions. Elephants, wolves, dogs, foxes, ba-
boons, llamas, magpies and other animals show signs of suffering and de-
spondency, withdrawing into solitude or collectively behaving in an unusual 
manner, walking, howling, staring into space, losing interest in food and 
normal activities, sometimes resorting to desperately trying to revive 
the dead, staying with the carcass for many days or burying it in the ground 
(Bekoff 2007; King 2013). Some of the animals perform what appear to be 
elaborate rituals to demonstrate their grief and stage a farewell to their dear 
companions. These instances of animal behaviour, clearly proving there is 
a capacity for mourning and compassion in a number of non-human species, 
have also been adduced by researchers to support a more controversial view 
that in order to behave in this manner, animals must have evolved their own 
morality (Bekoff and Pierce 2009). 
Rather than continuing with a discussion on animal morality, I will cling 
to the expanded notion of religion as capable of embracing other-than-
human rites of passage. To the observers of the aforementioned activities 
it is evident that the animals respond to the loss of life of a close companion, 
demonstrating a complex array of behaviours that affect their bodies and 
lives in individual ways. Their grief is a puzzle because it has no explainable 
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value in terms of the evolution of the species or its reproductive success. 
Some of the responses, like elephants’ funeral gatherings and gorillas’ wakes, 
apparently overlap with corresponding human forms which tend to be de-
scribed as having a religious character. Researchers have also noted in-
stances of ritual behaviour in animals other than humans in situations in-
volving natural phenomena like rain or fire (Goodall 2006).3 Supposing 
there is a line of biological and cultural continuity between human and non-
human animals, it is perhaps legitimate to draw the conclusion, as Donovan 
O. Schaefer does, that higher animals “are participating in the same affec-
tively driven ritual actions that led pre-linguistic humans to develop codified 
religion” (Schaefer 2012, 185; emphasis in the original). Animal religion, 
if we allow for its existence, may not be a question of articulating beliefs or 
monitoring moral behaviour as in the case of a human cult; yet it can still 
denote a corporeal, deeply felt experience (such as compassion, horror, fas-
cination and awe) stemming probably from the perception of mystery and 
inexplicable loss, power and beauty in the surrounding world.4 
Attributing grievability and grief to animal beings thus turns out to be 
a profoundly emancipatory gesture in both political and theological terms. 
It means not only including animals in the community of suffering, vulnera-
bility and finitude that has been the starting point of so much existential 
                                                 
3 I am alluding here to a famous account of the chimpanzees’ ritual behaviour at the 
waterfall at Kakombe, presented in Jane Goodall’s book Reason for Hope: A Spiritual Jour-
ney (1999), which she called “the dance of awe” (188–189). While discussing the passage, 
Kimberley Patton, who conducts an interview with Goodall, commented on its use of 
remarkably religious diction in the following way: “What is so amazing to me about what 
you describe […] is that so often theorists and scientists, particularly sociobiologists, will 
try to reduce human religious ritual, saying, ‘Well, it’s like animal ritual; animals have 
ritual too’. But what you suggest to me is that maybe we’re thinking about it backwards. 
It’s rather that ritual action is a natural response to living in a world of mystery and beauty 
and divinity. It is a response that is shared by animals with human beings. So it’s not that 
we can reduce human ritual behaviour to instinct ‘because animals do it too’, but rather 
that animals need to be brought conceptually into the sphere of human religious experi-
ence; animal ritual action might be ‘elevated’ to the world of human ritual action” (Goodall 
2006).  
4 Labelling animal practices of grieving and other rituals as religious may sound con-
troversial both to scholars of religion and to believers of most institutional churches. I do 
not want to embark here upon very complex considerations of what religion is; eschewing 
metaphysical declarations, I wish to point simply to the fact, as many ethologists do, that 
there is a clear overlap between some animal reactions to natural wonders or death and 
religious rituals as practiced by humans across history. Therefore, it seems justifiable to 
construe animal religion as a shared bodily (and emotional) response to what is beautiful, 
strange and inexplicable in nature. 
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reflection, but also turning them into ethical and religious subjects whose 
existence and affliction has clear ethical implications for the lives of their 
human companions. If they do mourn and are mourned by others, partici-
pating in rituals that fix their connection to culture (even if these ways of 
behaviour are highly specific, varying in content between different species), 
it becomes all the more plausible to view the social presence of animals as 
capable of producing a shared affect, as inviting new forms of solidarity and 
identification. As Stanescu remarks, “vulnerability and mourning are active 
forces that have been confused as passive and negative” (2012, 577). In hu-
mans, naming one’s vulnerability means recognising one’s capacity for being 
wounded and dependent on others, which has the potential to bring an indi-
vidual back into a community for care and sustenance or to find out one 
deserves this form of communal support. In other sentient creatures, it is 
much more than that: credited with the ability to suffer and mourn, and 
found grievable (even if there is a high risk of anthropomorphising), animals 
become reinscribed into the community of living beings and awarded social 
value as subjects and moral patients. Adding religious quality to their ex-
istence is still more interesting, not only making their lives theologically 
respectable and precious but also expanding the human understanding of 
religion in quite unpredictable ways. To think with Judith Butler’s notion of 
precariousness and to radicalise its consequences for the human-animal 
relations is thus to look for the new possibilities of implementing a social 
ethic that finds it impossible to disregard the fact that animal bodies are 
subject to omnipresent violence such as being universally slaughtered and 
utilised for human consumption. 
What still requires an explanation, however, is the question of political 
praxis and the chances of animal grievability entering the field of social 
perception. How can we make animal bodies a truly mournable presence if 
their precarity and suffering is hardly visible to the majority of world 
populations? How can the interpretative frames of what counts as a life be 
expanded to encompass the existence of an individual animal? These ques-
tions are not easily answered but one possibility is again provided by But-
ler’s discussion of precarity when she refers to the notion of political  
performativity (Butler 2015, 75). Making precarious and illegitimate lives 
visible in the public, in her view, entails embodied political resistance, or 
“the gathering of the ungrievable in public space” to demand recognition 
(Butler 2012, 18; Lloyd 2015, 220). Obviously, for animals themselves there 
is no way to exercise any political agency; yet their public appearance as 
vulnerable subjects is possible as part of human demonstrations highlighting 
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the problem of their affliction. Therefore, political actions such as animal 
rights rallies featuring dead animals over whose bodies people grieve may 
be one opportunity for animals to lay claim to public space (see photograph 
accompanying this essay).5 The staging of grief by activists alludes both to 
the solemnity of a funeral procession as the ultimate gesture of symbolic 
recognition and to the religious iconography of the pietà, which has its 
transgressive and emancipatory potential. 
Another option that Butler does not in fact mention is an aesthetics of af-
fect in art and literature. Importantly, the imagery based on bodily vulnera-
bility and mourning, with its philosophical and religious implications, can 
provide a powerful tool to innovative artists and writers who are concerned 
with imparting social visibility and ethical significance to animals. Cross-
species communities of affect can in fact be achieved not only by sympathis-
ing with the suffering, dying or dead animal but also, more significantly, 
through gestures of grieving that go beyond the species barrier by inscribing 
the animal affective experience in the framework of religious meanings. 
I have attempted to trace the subversive displacements of the sacred in 
literary and artistic works elsewhere;6 here, it seems sufficient to state that 
the poetic or dramatic representation of an animal as a fragile, precious and 
mournable being, one whose death is worthy of religious celebration, can be 
deeply empowering as it not only awards the creature with sentience and 
an affective experience of its own but also transforms it into a religious sub-
ject, a position long monopolised by human beings. Hence, it is an aesthetic 
intervention that may disturb the social image of spirituality and religiosity 
by questioning its distinctly anthropocentric contours. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 One prominent example is the National Animal Rights Day established in 2011 and 
now celebrated in many countries. Its organisers state that the event, remembering the 
animal victims of ever-growing human consumption, “was created to give a voice to these 
billions and billions of anonymous nameless beings. On this day, we stop everything else, 
and remember them. We mourn their loss, express their pain through ours, and reach out 
on their behalf to anyone who has a heart to listen” (qtd. on the NARD website: www. 
thenard.org [accessed: 15 July 2018]).  
6 This essay complements a previous article where I discuss a number of literary 
works featuring animal vulnerability and mourning, located in a clearly religious context. 
See Mitek-Dziemba 2019.  
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Conclusion 
 
In its lengthy discussion of theoretical concepts, the present article has 
sought to provide a new perspective on the critical importance of vulnerabil-
ity, mourning and compassion. Arguing for the existence of a cross-species 
community of affect, I have based my analyses on Judith Butler’s ontology 
of precariousness in its possible non-anthropocentric applications. Being 
naked, susceptible to injury and harm, vulnerable and fragile, experiencing 
both pain and desire can all be treated as common to all forms of sentient 
living. Precariousness is thus a universal condition whose occurrence re-
mains closely connected with the distribution of political and social pre-
carity. Vulnerability and precariousness pertain to both human and animal 
lives, and their negative impact is made evident in the absence of social 
recognition. Being unrecognisable as a life, however, as Butler makes it 
abundantly clear, means also being ungrievable: a bodily existence which 
matters not at all or is totally insignificant and invisible to the public eye. 
Therefore, unworthy of symbolic appreciation, it can be made redundant 
and disposed of. To prevent such treatment of precarious beings, it is neces-
sary to search for new forms of recognition and celebration, ones which also 
involve compassion and grief. This article argues that non-human animals 
can be recognised as political and religious subjects by means of new rituals 
of mourning which commemorate their death as the loss of living creatures. 
The argument points to the possibility of charting new trajectories of affect 
which succeed not only in establishing a cross-species community of vulner-
ability and suffering but also in bridging the gap between human and non-
human animals as religious subjects. The specific strategies used to mourn 
animals are then sought in political praxis, art and literature. In conclusion, 
it can be said that the aesthetic of affect, especially one exploiting the po-
litical and religious potential of grief and compassion, is a powerful means of 
imparting social visibility to bodies in suffering which may also contribute to 
the ongoing redefinition of the human-animal divide.  
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2015 National Animal Rights Day in Toronto, Canada. 
Photo by Jo Anne McArthur, courtesy of Their Turn 
[available on www.theirturn.net] 
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